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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
Steven C. Dahl, deceased, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
The Industrial Commission of 
the State of Utah, Revlon 
Service, Inc. and/or Liberty 
Mutual and/or Default 
Indemnity Fund, 
Defendants. 
RECEIVED 
Brigham Young University 
Law Library 
JRCB 
OPINION 
Case No. 860215-CA 
F I L E D 
APR 1 5 1987 
Before Judges Davidson, Greenwood and Jackson* 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
Timothy M. Shea 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court oi Appeals 
Plaintiff wife Cynthia Dahl appeals from an Industrial 
Commission denial of her Motion for Review of an Order 
dismissing her claim for dependent's death benefits. We 
reverse. 
Plaintiff and the deceased, Steven Bradley Dahl, were 
married in Colorado on October 22, 1978. Plaintiff was 
employed by Frontier Airlines and the deceased was unemployed. 
Several months after the marriage, the deceased took employment 
with Revlon Service, Inc. and continued in that employment 
until his death. During September of 1979, the couple moved to 
Utah so deceased could manage Revlon's local district. 
Plaintiff was able to base out of Salt Lake City and continued 
with the airline. Upon arrival in Utah, the couple purchased a 
home in Sandy. The financing arrangements required a monthly 
mortgage payment of approximately $778.00. The deceased 
suffered a heart attack in February of 1984. This appeared to 
trigger a decline in the marriage relationship. As a result, 
plaintiff departed the family home during November of 1984 and 
returned to Colorado. Plaintiff and the deceased maintained 
telephone contact and would meet when the latter had occasion 
to be in Denver. During January of 1985, the deceased filed a 
Complaint for divorce. In March of 1985, plaintiff's attorney 
prepared a Verified Motion for Order to Show Cause seeking 
temporary monthly support of $750.00. This motion was never 
heard because the parties agreed that the deceased would 
temporarily maintain the mortgage on the family hora&'aiid roak&> 
payments on the current debt obligations of the couple. 
Subsequently# both parties prepared Property Settlement and 
Separation Agreements. That of the deceased was signed by 
plaintiff on July 23, 1985, and by the deceased and his 
attorney on July 25, 1985. In the signed Agreement both 
parties waived alimony# the deceased was to make the mortgage 
payments on the home and pay plaintiff for her share of the 
equity therein, the parties were to equally share certain 
specific debt obligations, and the various personal property 
was distributed. The stipulation was filed with the District 
Court after Mr. Dahl's death which he met in a commercial 
aircraft accident on August 2, 1985, while returning from a 
business trip. The deceased's attorney had filed a 
Certification of Readiness for Trial in the District Court, but 
the matter had not been heard at the time of Steven Dahl's 
death. 
The hearing record reveals the parties* joint income to 
have been $57,624.00 in 1983 and $59,286.00 in 1984. In 1984, 
plaintiff's gross income was approximately $20,000.00 which 
reflects the two months she took off because of the deceased's 
heart attack in February of that year. During the initial 
three months following plaintiff's return to Denver, she sent 
the deceased $200.00 per month to assist in the expenses of the 
home and the joint debt obligations. These payments were 
discontinued when the deceased filed for divorce. At the time 
the deceased agreed to assume the joint debt obligations, these 
amounted to approximately $7,000.00, exclusive of the mortgage. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-73 (1986) requires death benefits to 
be paid to one or more dependents of the decedent. Section 
35-1-71(2) (1986) contains the presumption that a surviving 
spouse living with the decedent at the time of death is wholly 
dependent on the decedent. However, the same subsection 
states, "[i]n all other cases, the question of dependency,, in 
whole or in part, shall be determined in accordance with the 
facts in each particular case existing at the time of the 
injury or death of such employee....H Utah case law limits 
dependency to fact situations wherein the deceased has provided 
financial assistance or comparable assistance in the support of 
a dependent. Farnsworth v. Industrial Commission, 534 P.2d 
897, 898-899 (Utah 1975). 
The concept of dependency was explained by the Utah 
Supreme Court, "A dependent is one who looks to another for 
support, and the true criterion is whether one has a reasonable 
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expectation of continuing or future support - to receive such 
contributions as are necessary and needed to maintain him in 
his accustomed station in life.H Farnsworth at 899/ quoting 
Park Utah Consolidated Mines Co, v. Industrial Commission, 84 
Utah 481, 488, 36 P.2d 979 (1934). 
Dependency is determined by examining the facts. 
Normally, this is the province of the Industrial Commission as 
reiterated in Farnsworth at 899 quoting Rigby v. Industrial 
Commission, 75 Utah 454, 458, 286 P. 628 (1930). 
Whether one person is dependent upon 
another within the meaning of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act is primarily a 
question of fact. It is the exclusive 
province of the Industrial Commission to 
determine the facts and to draw legitimate 
inferences therefrom. It is also, in the 
first instance, the province of the 
Commission to determine from such facts 
and inferences whether dependency does or 
does not exist. When, however, the 
established facts and inferences 
reasonably deductible therefrom can lead 
to but one conclusion, a question of law 
is presented which this court, upon proper 
application, must review. 
The "established facts and inferences reasonably 
deductible" in this case lead to one conclusion. On the date 
of death, plaintiff was living apart from the deceased. 
However, she was depending upon him to make the full mortgage 
payment on their family home and to meet their significant 
joint debt payments. Plaintiff was able to maintain her 
standard of living only with the help of the decedent. It 
appears that the Administrative Law Judge applied a too narrow 
interpretation of dependency and focused only on whether day to 
day support was being provided. This was error. It is 
necessary to examine all aspects of dependency. When this is 
done, one conclusion is reached, that Mrs. Dahl was dependent 
upon decedent on the date of his death. 
Although we do not wish to stray into the period 
following Mr. Dahl's death, the financial burden which deluged 
plaintiff is a clear indication of the financial weight the 
deceased was bearing for her prior to his death. 
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The Industrial Commission's denial is reversed and this 
case is remanded for administrative action in accordance with 
the above. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO RECEIVED 
IteOlVf-C* 
k&hJLtLet n ^ I I I - a h r 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Caleen Lowe Jones, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MAY Q I 19b/ 
JRCB 
Case No. 860199-CA 
$»» r^ 
Before Judges Orme, Greenwood and Billings. 
ORME, Judge: 
F I L 
APR 151987 
Timothy M. Shea 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Defendant was convicted of child abuse, a second degree 
felony, and sentenced to a term of not less than one nor more 
than fifteen years at the Utah State Penitentiary. On appeal, 
she seeks reversal or modification of her conviction on the 
theory that "physical injury" as defined in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-109(1)(b) (1986) means a single act of abuse and cannot 
mean several such acts. Her theory ignores the definitional 
scheme in the child abuse statute and its acceptance would 
thwart the purpose of the act. Accordingly, we affirm. 
THE STATUTORY SCHEME 
Defendant's primary contention on appeal is that if the 
child abuse statute were properly construed, her conviction 
should be reversed or at least reduced to a misdemeanor.! 
Since the issue is one of statutory construction and the 
statute is of recent origin, we quote the statute in its 
entirety: 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Child" means a human being who is 17 years of 
age or less; 
1. Defendant also contends there was prejudicial error in 
permitting the state's expert to testify concerning the 
cumulative effects of the repeated acts of abuse suffered by 
Defendant's child. As will become clear, the propriety of that 
testimony turns entirely on the construction given the statute. 
(b) HPhysical injuryN means impairment of the 
physical condition including, but not limited to, 
any contusion of the skin, laceratioV, failure to 
thrive, malnutrition, burn, fracture of any bone, 
subdural hematoma, injury to any internal organ, any 
injury causing bleeding, or any physical condition 
which imperils a child's health or welfare; 
(c) "Serious physical injury" means any physical 
injury which creates a permanent disfigurement; 
protracted loss or impairment of a function of a 
body member, limb or organ, or substantial risk of 
death. 
(2) Any person who inflicts upon a child serious 
physical injury or, having the care and custody of 
such child, causes or permits another to inflict 
serious physical injury upon a child is guilty of an 
offense as follows: 
(a) If done intentionally or knowingly, the offense 
is a felony of the second degree; 
(b) If done recklessly, the offense is a felony of 
the third degree; 
(c) If done with criminal negligence, the offense is 
a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Any person who inflicts upon a child physical 
injury or, having the care and custody of such 
child, causes or permits another to inflict physical 
injury upon a child is guilty of an offense as 
follows: 
(a) If done intentionally or knowingly, the offense 
is a class A misdemeanor; 
(b) If done recklessly, the offense is a class B 
misdemeanor; 
(c) If done with criminal negligence, the offense is 
a class C misdemeanor. 
(4) Criminal actions under this section may be 
prosecuted in the county or district where the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, where the 
existence of the offense is discovered, where the 
victim resides, or where the defendant resides. 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-5-109 (1986). 
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The statute defines child abuse crimes of varying 
severity based on six possible combinations of the extent of 
injury sustained by the child and the degree of the 
perpetrator's culpability. At one end of this scale is class C 
misdemeanor status for the perpetrator who causes or permits 
non-serious injury as a result of criminally negligent 
conduct. At the other end of the scale is second degree felony 
status for persons who intentionally or knowingly cause or 
permit serious injury to a child. The act also provides 
definitions of the terms "physical injury" and "serious 
physical injury" and for liberal venue. 
PERTINENT FACTS 
The key facts in this case are undisputed. Defendant and 
her 16-month old baby moved in with Defendant's boyfriend. 
Approximately a month later, the baby sustained cardiac arrest, 
which was reversed, but died shortly after from edema, or 
critical swelling, of the brain. Only weeks prior to his 
death, the baby sustained second degree burns on his buttocks 
and down one leg. The burns were in a grid-like pattern 
corresponding to the inside of a clothes dryer door. Defendant 
was slow in getting her baby to the hospital. After the baby's 
release from the hospital, Defendant failed to follow 
instructions for treatment of the burns, permitting the baby's 
diapers to remain saturated with urine. A police investigation 
ensued and Defendant agreed to keep her baby away from her 
boyfriend. Nevertheless, she and her baby moved back in with 
the boyfriend. Shortly after the three were reunited, the baby 
suffered cardiac arrest. Medical personnel who had treated the 
burns reported numerous bruises of varying sizes and ages over 
much of the baby's body. Medical personnel who re-established 
the baby's heartbeat noticed puncture wounds, probably 
inflicted with a fork, on the bottom of his feet. 
Dr. William Martin Palmer, a physician and expert on 
child abuse, testified at trial that no one of the identified 
instances of abuse, taken alone, created "permanent 
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of a function of a 
body member, limb or organ[;] or substantial risk of death." 
However, Dr. Palmer testified, over Defendant's objection, that 
the combination of the abusive acts did pose a substantial risk 
of death. 
ANALYSIS 
Defendant argues that section 1(c) of the child abuse 
statute defines "serious physical injury" in terms of "any 
physical injury which creates a ... substantial risk of 
death." Defendant equates "any" with "one," and argues that 
since no one of the occurrences created a substantial risk of 
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death to the baby, she can not be guilty of causing or 
permitting serious physical injury under Section 2 of the 
statute.2 On that basis, her conviction should be reversed 
or, at the least, reduced to a conviction under Section 3 for 
abuse of a non-serious type. It is Defendant's contention that 
her conviction could be sustained only if the burn, bv itself, 
or neglect in the treatment of the burn, bv itself, or an 
individual bruise, by itself, or an individual puncture wound, 
bv itself, could be shown to have been life-threatening. 
Defendant's theory might be plausible if in enacting the 
child abuse act the Legislature had in mind the ordinary 
meaning of the word -injury." "Injury" in common parlance 
means "3H act that damages, harms, or hurts." Webster's Third 
New International Dictionary 1164 (1986) (Emphasis add€*d). 
However, the Legislature has provided in the child abuse act a 
definition which is expansive and clear, and which precludes 
the construction argued for by Defendant. Leaving aside the 
several examples mentioned in subsection 1(b) of the statute, 
"physical injury" is defined there simply as an "impairment of 
the physical condition." "Serious physical injury," under 
subsection 1(c), accordingly means "impairment of the physical 
condition" which results in "a permanent disfigurement; 
protracted loss or impairment of a function of a body member, 
limb, or organ [;] or substantial risk of 
2. Although not raised in the briefs, the State pointed out at 
oral argument that since Dr. Palmer also testified that the 
baby died from brain swelling and that the swelling most likely 
resulted from a deliberate violent act, such as severe shaking, 
the jury's verdict of conviction can be sustained even if 
Defendant's argument as to the meaning of the statute is 
accepted. In view of the decision we reach, it is not 
necessary to consider this contention. 
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death."3 Since Defendant's baby was subjected to a course of 
abuse which constituted "impairment" of his condition, and 
since that impairment entailed a "substantial risk of death" as 
the state's expert testified,4 it follows that Defendant was 
duly convicted of second degree felony child abuse since the 
jury also concluded that Defendant intentionally or knowingly 
abused her child and/or intentionally or knowingly permitted 
her boyfriend to do so.5 
While our affirmance in this case is based on a plain 
reading of the act under which Defendant was convicted, other 
factors support our conclusion. The Court's primary 
responsibility in construing legislation is to give effect to 
the intent of the Legislature. Christensen v. Industrial 
Commission, 642 P.2d 755, 756 (Utah 1982). In addition, 
one of the fundamental rules of statutory 
construction is that the statute should be 
looked at as a whole and in light of the 
general purpose it was intended to serve; and 
should be so interpreted and applied as 
3. At oral argument, Defendant argued that "physical injury" 
and "serious physical injury" are, in effect, two totally 
self-standing and independent concepts. According to 
Defendant, "physical injury" means just what subsection 1(b) 
says it does and includes the more expansive concept of 
"impairment." By contrast, "serious physical injury" means 
just what it says and it does not include the concept of 
"impairment." We cannot agree. Even though the Legislature 
did not specifically state that the term "physical injury" as 
used in subsection 1(c) shall be defined in accordance with 
subsection 1(b), it would be absurd to look to Webster's for 
the definition of "physical injury" as used in subsection 1(c) 
where a specific definition of that very term is provided in 
the immediately preceding subsection of an integrated and 
carefully drawn statute. This is particularly true where the 
text introducing the definitions makes clear that the 
definitions are to be used throughout the entire statutory 
section. 
4. Since we reject Defendant's interpretation of the statute, 
we necessarily find no error in permitting the doctor to 
testify that the overall impairment of the baby's physical 
condition was, in his opinion, life-threatening. 
5. Defendant's boyfriend, James Chad Anderson, pleaded guilty 
to third degree felony child abuse and was sentenced to a 
prison term of not to exceed five years. The trial court 
recommended that the entire sentence be served. 
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to accomplish that objective. In order to 
give the statute the implementation which 
will fulfill its purpose, reason and 
intention sometimes prevail over technically 
applied literalness. 
Andrus v. Mired, 17 Utah 2d 106, 109, 404 P.2d 972, 974 
(1965). To limit the definition of "serious physical injury" 
to one individual "injury" in the literal sense would thwart 
the major purpose of the act, which is to curb the increase in 
child abuse by imposing stiffer penalties on child abusers. 
See "Utah Legislative Survey," 1982 Utah L. Rev. 164. Even 
absent the definitional provisions upon which we rely, we would 
not assume that the Legislature intended to distinguish between 
severe abuse caused by a single violent act and severe abuse 
typified by a series of violent acts with a cumulatively 
debilitating effect. 
Finally, we note that Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-106 (1978) 
provides that the criminal laws of this state shall not be 
construed strictly, but rather "according to the fair import of 
their terms to promote justice." 
Proper interpretation of the child abuse statute 
requires our conclusion that multiple injuries which 
cumulatively result in impairment of a child's physical 
condition will sustain a second degree felony conviction where 
the impairment is of the requisite magnitude and the 
perpetrator's conduct is knowing or intentional. Defendant's 
conviction is accordingly affirmed. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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